Introduction
The end of the Cold War has encouraged many scholars to outline emerging postbipolar landscapes. Among cultural and ethnocentric approaches, particularly popular due to the ethnic turbulence in the early 1990s, the one that has attracted unexpected attention is Huntington's (1993a Huntington's ( ,b, 1996 clash of civilizations theory. Mostly critical reactions of the world intellectual community have not reduced the influence of Huntington's seductive arguments on policymakers. Moreover, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following Al-Qaeda's attacks against the USA in 2001 seem to correspond with the suggested vision of insuperable civilizational cleavage. The theory was given wide media coverage, and the possibility of the clash between the Western and Islamic civilizations was discussed by world leaders, including presidents Bush and Khatami.
Huntington believes that 'a civilizational paradigm thus sets forth a relatively simple but not too simple map for understanding what is going on in the world as the twentieth century ends' (Huntington, 1996: 37) . As the 20th century has just ended, it is possible to test the clash of civilizations thesis and estimate its validity for the future. The first purpose of this article is to examine Huntington's key propositions on the basis of the data recording armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) in this case) and during the Cold War period . The second purpose is to identify a trend in violence between civilizations.
After deducing essential hypotheses from Huntington's works, the article reviews previous empirical tests of the clash of civilizations theory. The next section describes the research design used in the analysis and explains the findings.
Huntington's Thesis
The clash of civilizations theory is based on a bold premise: 'In the post-Cold War world the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural' (Huntington, 1996: 21) . 1 Contrary to the scholars distinguishing ethnic, linguistic, and religious dissimilarities, Huntington emphasizes civilization as 'the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity' (Huntington, 1996: 41) . In his legendary essay (Huntington, 1993a) , he differentiated between the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and 'possibly' African civilizations. This list was updated in his book (Huntington, 1996) , where he divides the world into nine 'major civilizations': African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, and Western.
What is his vision of the post-Cold War era? Huntington explicitly formulates the essence of his theory: 'Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future' (Huntington, 1993a: 22) .
As is shown below, however, it is difficult to test the clash of civilizations theory empirically. This study extracts three elementary hypotheses from Huntington's statement: 'conflict between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization' (Huntington, 1993a: 48) . Therefore we may deduce:
H1: Intercivilizational conflicts are more frequent during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.
H2:
During the post-Cold War period, intercivilizational conflicts last longer than other armed conflicts.
H3: During the post-Cold War period, intercivilizational conflicts cause more battle-related deaths than other armed conflicts.
The most controversial proposition is the one about 'Islam's bloody borders'. In Huntington's perspective, 'the fault line conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims' (Huntington, 1996: 208) . In order to test this hypothesis, we must study the involvement of each civilization in armed conflict during and after the Cold War. Connor, 1994) , searching roots of conflict deep in cultural (especially religious and ethnic) differences. This approach, based on a vision of given and static identities, is criticized by instrumentalists, emphasizing intercultural cooperation and the changing nature of cultural unities. Cultural dissimilarities are seen not as the key factor explaining international politics, but rather as a tool used and abused by political elites (Brass, 1985; Gagnon, 1995; Steinberg, 1981) . For further discussion, see for example Henderson (1997 
Previous Empirical Tests
Despite the passionate discussion provoked by Huntington's work (especially 1993a Huntington's work (especially , 1996 , only a few scholars have tried to test his propositions empirically. Their studies might be divided into two main branches. Within the first one, Henderson & Tucker (2001: 317) 'examined the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war', and Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000) , as well as Shannon (2002) , dealt with militarized interstate disputes. Chiozza (2002) , using a wide range of violent and nonviolent conflicts between states, was even more complex. Gurr (1994) , Fox (2001), and Roeder (2003) , representing another branch, evaluated the clash of civilizations thesis with regard to ethnic conflict within states. Besides these approaches, there are a small number of investigations not directly addressing the issues of organized violence. 2 In general, the empirical results provide little support to Huntington's expectations. Contiguity, democracy, and other 'traditional' predictors seem to be much more important than civilization membership. 3 Neither did the likelihood of intercivilizational conflict rise after the Cold War ended. The increase in intensity 'was part of an escalation in all types of cross-cultural conflict' (Roeder, 2003: 509 ). Huntington's claims regarding Islamic threat are generally considered unfounded.
Nevertheless, there are four main limitations of these empirical tests. First, as Huntington (2000: 609) argued, interstate conflicts are 'a small and possibly quite unrepresentative, sample of the violent conflicts in the world'. This assumption weakens the arguments of the first group of critics. On the other hand, the datasets used by Fox (2001) and Roeder (2003) , owing to their focus on ethnic disputes, do not include all intrastate conflicts (preponderant civil wars in Algeria and Colombia are excellent examples), and they do not take into account international conflicts. Second, the temporally limited studies of Gurr (1994) , Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000) , Henderson & Tucker (2001) , and Shannon (2002) cover no more than a few years of the post-Cold War period. Third, the previous tests, except Roeder (2003) , pay little attention to the fact that Huntington considers the fault-line conflict not only more frequent, but also 'more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization' (Huntington, 1993a: 48) . Finally, the primary purpose of the mentioned studies is to test Huntington's argument about the particular importance of the civilizational difference as a predictor of conflict after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, they make only limited attempts to study the real trend in civilizational violence over a longer period.
Research Design
The dataset analyzed in this article is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (hereafter UCDP). The primary source is Gleditsch et al. (2002) . The UCDP defines armed conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state.' In this study, the conflict-year is used as the basic unit of analysis. This decision enables the construction of a dataset containing not only interstate but also extrasystemic, internationalized internal, and internal armed conflicts. 4 It is thus in line with Huntington's definition: 'Fault line conflicts are communal conflicts between states or groups from different civilizations. . . . Such wars may occur between states, between nongovernmental groups, and between states and nongovernmental groups' (Huntington, 1996: 252) . 5 On the other hand, concentration on the conflict cases prevents this article from replicating the multivariate analyses of Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000) , Henderson & Tucker (2001) , and Chiozza (2002) , because they were based on the use of interstate dyads. 6 Their research design allowed them to measure the probability of conflict in a dyad given its civilizational status while controlling for various political and economic factors. But the price was high -the vast majority of conflicts were ignored. 7 The purpose of this article is not a simple replication of previous tests on an extended dataset, however. It focuses on a description of the trends in civilizational conflict over time and two new hypotheses (2 and 3).
Each case in the dataset contains information about the civilization membership of all the participants of the conflict. But identifying the civilization of a country is difficult, and Huntington's map (Huntington, 1996: 26-27 ) is not very helpful. The criteria are as ambiguous as the number of civilizations itself. 8 Predominant religion seems to be the main criterion. But geographical location (especially for the African and Latin American civilizations) and linguistic similarity (Caribbean states) are also important. Some countries are considered 'cleft' or 'torn'. The division in nine 'major' civilizations (African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, and Western) relies on Huntington's map and, where the map is unclear, on his text. The former British Caribbean colonies are inserted in the tenth category ('Other'). Huntington's book identifies these countries as an independent civilization, though not worthy of much attention since they do not constitute a 'major' civilization. The 'Other' category also contains two 'lone' countries, Ethiopia and Haiti. Israel is coded as Other because the book identifies it as a nonWestern state, and its civilization is called Gleditsch et al. (2002) for the definitions of interstate, extrasystemic, internationalized internal, and internal armed conflicts as well as government. The definitions may also be found at http://www.tusi.szm.sk/research/. 5 The UCDP does not record fights between nongovernmental actors, though 'such fights occurred, for instance, in Myanmar' (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001: 634) . The Uppsala definition, used also in this dataset, does not allow studying this kind of conflicts. 6 Besides, concentration on conflict cases also poses the problem of a potential selection bias. Without comparison with non-conflict cases, it is theoretically possible that the results could be contaminated by unmeasured changes in the civilizational composition of the world. However, Huntington (1996) states that a civilization lasts thousands of years. His critics are not so convinced, but nobody expects significant changes in civilizational composition during the short period after the World War II. Furthermore, there is no safe way to define non-conflict cases in research using both inter-and intrastate conflicts because countries might be involved in numerous internal and interstate inter-and intracivilizational conflicts at the same time (e.g. India, Myanmar, Ethiopia). 7 Internal conflicts are responsible for 75.1% of all conflictyears and for 64.1% of all conflicts in our dataset.
'Judaism', 'Political Judaism', or 'Zionism'. Kazakhstan, Guyana, and Surinam belong to this category because of the absence of any absolute religious majority (i.e. more than 50% of population). Religious composition was also the main criterion to delimitate the frontier between the African and Islamic civilizations. The states with greater than 50% Muslim population are assigned to the Islamic group and the rest to the African group. Despite the efforts, every division based on civilizational concept is doubtful. Is Eritrea (with 69.3% Muslims) an Islamic country? According to the logic used to construct our dataset, it is. But its government is still suspected of favoritism -in favor of the Orthodox Church.
Division of nongovernmental actors among civilizations is even more problematic because other quantitative studies are focused on states, except Fox (2001) and Roeder (2003) . The criteria are simple: relationship to an existing governmental actor (e.g. Croatian insurgents belong to the same civilization as Croatia) and predominant religion in the territory (e.g. Catholic East Timor is coded as Western). In other words, rebel territories belong to the same civilization as the religious majority of their inhabitants. The membership of most of the nongovernmental actors is unambiguous. There are some uncertain cases, however. Maronite Christian militias in Lebanon are coded as Other because of their Arabic character. Karen and Kachin are included in the Buddhist civilization, but the religious composition of their habitants is more complex. All states in India with Hindu majority belong to the Hindu civilization. Kashmir is coded as Islamic; Sikhs and the insurgents in Nagaland and Mizoram as Other.
There is a dummy variable for each civilization. Another dummy variable, 'Intercivilizational conflict', is set to 1 if a conflict-year includes members of different civilizations, and 0 otherwise. Presence of a war (coded by the dummy variable 'War') is characterized by at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. According to the UCDP, the incompatibility may concern 'Territory' or 'Government'. The dataset distinguishes 'Extrastate', 'Interstate', 'Internationalized internal', and 'Internal' armed conflicts. The data cover the period 1946-2001, and the dataset contains 1,699 conflict-years. The Cold War period is defined as the years 1946-89 and the post-Cold War period as the years 1990-2001. The dataset covers a larger number of years in the post-Cold War period than the data used in previous research.
Before proceeding to the analysis, the broad Hypothesis 1 should be nuanced. First, the predicted prominence of the clash of civilizations after the end of the Cold War might be attributed to the rise in the absolute number of conflicts between civilizations as well as to the relative rise in proportion to all conflicts. The latter way to measure frequency of civilizational violence should be more meaningful because the absolute number of all conflicts has decreased dramatically after 1992 (Gleditsch et al., 2002) . That is the reason why two new hypotheses were constructed:
H1a: The absolute number of intercivilizational conflict-years is higher during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.
H1b:
The ratio of intercivilizational conflictyears to all conflict-years is higher during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.
Second, not all conflicts between the members of different civilizations need to be civilizational in Huntington's terms. This is the case with many clashes between ideological blocs during the Cold War. For example, the Korean War is coded as intercivilizational despite its political and ideological roots. Virtually every conflict has a cultural dimension, and the civilizational difference is more pronounced (Bosnia) or less (India vs. China) among a variety of explanatory factors.
It is therefore very difficult to single out the conflicts that are based primarily on cultural distinctions, and this fact is especially true in quantitative research. Nevertheless, it is possible to exclude the conflicts which are certainly 'less' civilizational: all conflicts concerning the form of government because Huntington (1993a) characterizes fault-line conflicts as fought 'over the control of territory'; and all extrastate conflicts because their purpose is colonial liberation. The resulting list, which with a bit of exaggeration I will call 'core' intercivilizational conflict, is defined by the 'Incompability' variable equal to 'Territory', the 'Type' variable other than 'Extrastate', and the dummy 'Intercivilizational conflict' equal to 1.
H1c:
The absolute number of core intercivilizational conflict-years is higher during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.
H1d:
The ratio of core intercivilizational conflict-years to all conflict-years is higher during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period.
The other hypotheses can be transformed in the same way:
H2a: During the post-Cold War period, intercivilizational conflicts last longer than other armed conflicts.
H2b: During the post-Cold War period, core intercivilizational conflicts last longer than other armed conflicts.
H3a: During the post-Cold War period, intercivilizational conflicts cause more battle-related deaths than other armed conflicts.
H3b: During the post-Cold War period, core intercivilizational conflicts cause more battle-related deaths than other armed conflicts. Figure 1 , they can be seen as very short periods of discontinuity (a swift increase) between two slightly decreasing slopes.
Analysis and Discussion
What about the ratio of the number of intercivilizational conflict-years to all conflict-years? While the curve of the absolute frequency looks quite flat, the curve of the relative frequency can be easily approximated by a high-order polynomial function. For example, a ninth-order polynomial function accounts for more than 80% of the variability (R 2 = 0.803). 9 Thus, there is a non-linear relative decline in intercivilizational conflict.
At least since 1946, intercivilizational conflicts have occurred in waves. There are upswings in the absolute frequency of intercivilizational conflict-years at the beginning of the 1960s and 1980s, and the curve of relative frequency rises at these same times. In 1992, another period of relative increase begins. It could be seen as weak evidence in favor of Huntington's thesis. Since the curve of absolute frequency in the 1990s is relatively flat, if not slightly decreasing, the last increase in the ratio of the number of 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 The mean square error and sum of squares of residuals are lower than in the case of linear or lower-order polynomial models. Residuals were also checked for independence and normality, so they seem to contain only noise and no systematic components (another trend or seasonality).
intercivilizational conflict to all conflict years could be attributed to a decline in the number of conflicts within civilizations. There is a considerable decrease in conflict within civilizations after 1992, while conflicts between civilizations remain a relatively stable subset of all conflicts. Although the curve representing the proportion of core intercivilizational conflictyears to all conflict-years has many fluctuations, a kind of cyclical pattern is clearly visible and it is possible to approximate it using a polynomial function of time.
There is a period of decrease from the maximum in 1964 until 1981. From that year, the proportion of core intercivilizational conflict-years rises until another peak in 1999. Briefly, there is an increase in relative frequency of the core 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 , 1946-2001 intercivilizational conflicts during the postCold War period (from 25% in 1946-89 to 26.8% in 1990-2001) , but this increase is obviously a part of a longer upswing starting in the early 1980s. Again, two points of transition (maximum in 1964 and minimum in 1981) are clearly visible.
To sum up the evaluation of Hypothesis 1, there is no particular increase in either absolute or relative frequency of intercivilizational conflict linked to the end of the Cold War. The trend seems to be rather continual over a longer period.
An evaluation of Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the fault-line conflicts last longer than other conflicts, needs another kind of data. Thus, a new dataset was constructed. The basic unit of analysis is armed conflict. 10 Each case contains information about the length of the conflict and the dummies 'Intercivilizational conflict', 'Core intercivilizational conflict', and 'Post-Cold War'. The last dummy variable indicates whether the conflict starts after the end of the Cold War. The duration is measured in the number of calendar years producing at least 25 battle-related deaths. It seems to be the safest way to operationalize the duration of the analyzed conflicts, because precise end dates are not reported by the UCDP. The conflicts ongoing in 2001 have the dummy variable 'Censored' equal to 1. This new variable is necessary for a duration analysis. The dataset contains 295 cases, covering the period 1946-2001.
Cox regression was applied because the dataset contains right-censored data (11.5% of conflicts had not ended by the end of the observation period). The chi-square (3.68 using intercivilizational and 4.74 using core intercivilizational conflicts) indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero (significance 0.30 and 0.19, respectively), so the overall fit of the model is unsatisfactory. Table I shows that there is no significant effect of the interaction between 'Intercivilizational conflict' (or 'Core intercivilizational conflict') and 'Post-Cold War' variables. The coefficients remain insignificant also after dropping the interaction term. It means that there is no statistically significant relationship between civilizational difference and duration of conflict whether we consider the post-Cold War period or the whole period 1946-2001. Hypotheses 2a and 2b are not supported. Hypothesis 3 states that the conflicts between the groups belonging to different civilizations are more violent than the conflicts between the groups sharing the same civilization. Is this claim supported by empirical results? The basic unit of analysis is the armed conflict. I added the dummy variable 'War' (1 if the conflict escalated to a war, i.e. there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in at least one conflict-year; 0 otherwise). Table II shows the results of a logistic regression predicting the presence of a war in a conflict. 11 The introduction of a statistically significant interaction term indicates that the coefficients must be interpreted conditionally (Friedrich, 1982) . Accordingly, I computed the conditional effects. The results reveal an interesting change in the escalation dynamics. For intracivilizational conflict, the probability of war decreased from 47.8% in the Cold War period to 23.9% in the postCold War period. On the other hand, for intercivilizational conflict, the probability of war remains virtually unchanged (51.8% and 53.5%, respectively). A similar result is obtained if we use core intercivilizational conflicts. The probability of war during and after the Cold War is the same (55.7% and 55.0%) while the escalation of other kinds of conflict is less likely after 1989 (a decrease from 47.3% to 27.7%). Because of the interaction term, the significance of the coefficients in Table II Roeder (2003: 509, 534 ) also finds that 'contacts between civilizations within states were more likely than were contacts that do not cross linguistic or religious lines to escalate to more intense conflicts. . . . Yet, civilizational divides were not unique in this regard; other cultural differences such as the clash of ethnolinguistic traditions were as likely to escalate to equally intense conflicts.'
As far as battle-related deaths are concerned, post-Cold War conflicts between civilizations seem to be more violent than conflicts within civilizations. Hypothesis 3 is thus validated. A closer look uncovers the true cause: intercivilizational conflicts during the post-Cold War period are as severe as during the Cold War period, but the escalation of conflicts within civilizations into war is less likely after the end of the Cold War.
The analysis shows the relationship between civilization difference and conflict intensity. However, the prediction value of the model without additional predictors is quite low. 13 Despite the fact that approximately 56% of the predicted values in the classification table are correct, Nagelkerke R 2 = 0.05.
In short, there is no particular increase in the frequency of civilizational conflicts at the end of the Cold War, yet these results suggest a qualitative change in escalation dynamics, depending on civilizational difference. Another unanswered question is whether the involvement of different civilizations in armed conflict is also altered in the postCold War world. Table III provides insight into the structure of the clash of civilizations. 14 Since the struggles related to decolonization and ideological dissimilarity have been settled, groups belonging to the Western civilization have fewer opportunities to fight during the postCold War period. But the number of core intercivilizational conflicts decreased less remarkably. The Buddhist and Sinic civilizations benefit from the considerable decrease both in intercivilizational and core intercivilizational conflict. The Islamic and African civilizations are involved in fewer intercivilizational conflict-years, though in more core intercivilizational conflict-years in comparison with the Cold War period. An unambiguous increase is observed in the case of the Hindu and Orthodox civilizations. Regarding the warfare between civilizations, the Islamic civilization remains the most conflict-prone. During the Cold War period, the intercivilizational conflict-years involving Islamic groups constituted 27.8% of all conflict-years and during the post-Cold War period 25.4%. The number of conflict-years within the Islamic civilization rose from 12.6% to 22.5% likewise. A similar increase is observed in the case of the African civilization. In general, the clashes within civilizations have become more widespread. Table III seems to support Huntington's (1996: 257-258) 
The method is clarified in Friedrich (1982: 820 Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000 ), de Soysa (2002 ), and Roeder (2003 suggesting that 'the Islamic civilization is not conflicting in particular with the West' (Fox, 2001: 466) . The conclusion regarding the Sinic civilization is also in line with other studies. As to the 'Islam's bloody borders and innards ', Fox (2001: 466) claims: 'Islamic ethnic groups, both during and after the Cold War, have been involved in the majority of civilizational conflicts, and the majority of conflicts involving Islamic ethnic groups have been civilizational.' But he did not find as remarkable a shift in the conflict within the Islamic civilization as this study did. This difference might be attributed to the use of different data. This article also points to the rise in violence within 
Conclusion
Previous empirical tests of the clash of civilizations thesis have shown that the civilizational paradigm could not replace realist and liberal approaches. According to the results described in this study, however, the clash of civilizations seems to be a real and important phenomenon. Despite the fact that the relationship between civilizational difference and duration of conflict is not statistically significant, the relative importance of fault-line conflicts after the end of the Cold War is apparent if we analyze their intensity (and in the case of the so-called core intercivilizational conflicts, also their frequency). In short, conflicts within civilizations are less frequent and less likely to escalate into war during the post-Cold War period than during the Cold War period. On the other hand, the frequency and intensity of conflicts between civilizations remain virtually as high as in the Cold War. But a closer look reveals that the increase in relative frequency is significant only as a part of a longer upswing starting in the early 1980s. As to the absolute frequency, there are three periods after World War II, and each of them is characterized by a higher number of intercivilizational conflict-years than the previous one. The last one began in the early 1980s, halting a relative decline in civilizational violence since the 1960s. There is also another challenge to the traditional approach to the clash of civilizations thesis: the relative frequency of intercivilizational conflicts seems to decline non-linearly over the whole period To sum up, the civilizational approach cannot represent the Holy Grail of the postCold War quest for a new paradigm, but it might complement other concepts. Yet, it has to overcome the limits of Huntington's view. There is no obvious relationship between the dynamics of civilizational conflict and the magic year 1989. Neither do the empirical tests support the apocalyptic vision of the final battle against a SinoIslamic alliance. Should this approach be exploited in the future, various ambiguous issues left by Huntington's pioneering work would have to be discussed: definition of a civilization, delimitation of civilization's borders in space, and comparison with other well-known cultural characteristics, such as religion, ethnicity, and linguistic similarity.
